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12(B) WHAT? SLATER AND ENFORCING 
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES  
THROUGH DISMISSAL 
Abstract: On March 8, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held in Slater v. Energy Services Group International, Inc. that Rule 
12(b)(3) governs motions to dismiss under a forum selection clause, 
whereas 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs motions to transfer under a forum se-
lection clause. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit further weighed in on the 
disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal over the proper mecha-
nism to enforce a forum selection clause through dismissal. This Com-
ment argues that although the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Slater is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., the holding furthers sentiments implicit in the Supreme 
Court’s holding and furthers principles behind forum selection clauses 
more broadly. 
Introduction 
 In 1988, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the Supreme 
Court was presented with the question of whether federal law or state 
law controls when transferring cases pursuant to a forum selection 
clause.1 The Court, finding 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to be sufficiently broad 
to cover this dispute, held that section 1404(a) governs the transfer of 
cases pursuant to forum selection clauses.2 Although Stewart deter-
mined the proper mechanism to enforce forum selection clauses 
through transfer, it left undetermined the proper vehicle to enforce a 
forum selection clause through dismissal.3 Against this backdrop of un-
certainty, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in its 2011 
decision Slater v. Energy Services Group International, Inc., held that dis-
missal pursuant to a forum selection clause was properly brought as a 
                                                                                                                      
1 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988). 
2 Id. at 26–28; see also Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 
2002) (noting that in Stewart, the Supreme Court “held that the issue of whether the fo-
rum-selection clause should be given effect was governed by federal law, specifically 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a)”). 
3 Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(noting the uncertainty as to the appropriate motion to enforce forum selection clauses). 
111 
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motion to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(3).4 
 This Comment evaluates the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Slater in 
light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart and the principles be-
hind forum selection clauses.5 Part I outlines the facts and procedural 
history of Slater.6 Part II then discusses the venue statutes and the cir-
cuits’ various approaches to enforcing forum selection clauses through 
dismissal.7 Finally, Part III argues that although the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Slater is facially inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Stewart, it furthers notions implicit in Stewart and principles be-
hind forum selection clauses.8 
I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Slater 
 On May 14, 2006, the plaintiff, Mindy Slater, signed an employ-
ment agreement with Energy Services Group International, Inc. 
(“ESGI”), which contained a forum selection clause.9 The clause stated: 
“The parties agree that all claims or causes of action relating to or aris-
ing from this Agreement shall be brought in a court in the City of 
Richmond, Virginia.”10 Slater was eventually terminated from ESGI.11 
 Slater brought an action against ESGI (and other defendants) in 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.12 Slater con-
tended that ESGI violated Title VII, the Florida Civil Rights Act, and the 
Florida Whistleblower Act.13 Specifically, she argued that ESGI dis-
criminated against her for being pregnant and retaliated against her 
because she refused to engage in illegal employment practices.14 In re-
sponse, ESGI filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).15 The district court granted 
ESGI’s motion to dismiss, and Slater appealed.16 
                                                                                                                      
4 634 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011). 
5 See infra notes 9–75 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 9–21 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 22–56 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 57–75 and accompanying text. 
9 Slater, 634 F.3d at 1328–29. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1329. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-208-T-24-EAJ, 2009 WL 1010951, at 
*1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2011). 
15 Slater, 634 F.3d at 1329. 
16 Id. 
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 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the District 
Court had erred in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(3) instead of 
performing a transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).17 In holding 
that Rule 12(b)(3) was the proper mechanism for requesting dismissal 
under a forum selection clause, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its 1998 
decision, Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.18 Further, the Elev-
enth Circuit noted that its conclusion was supported by Stewart, in 
which the Supreme Court held that federal transfer of venue statutes 
apply to forum selection clauses.19 
 Ultimately, in Slater, the Eleventh Circuit held that section 1404(a) 
is the proper mechanism for enforcing forum selection clauses through 
transfer.20 Conversely, when a party is seeking to enforce a forum selec-
tion clause through dismissal, Rule 12(b)(3) is the appropriate proce-
dural device.21 
II. Mechanisms for Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses 
 In 1988, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., the Supreme 
Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs the transfer of a case based 
on diversity jurisdiction under a forum selection clause.22 It did not de-
termine, however, the proper mechanism for dismissal.23 Section A of 
this Part discusses the statutes that govern venue in federal district 
court.24 Section B summarizes the different approaches the circuits 
have used to enforce forum selection clauses through dismissal.25 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. at 1330. There were two other issues on appeal. Id. First, the plaintiff argued that 
the district court had erred in finding that her discrimination claims against her employer 
were within the scope of the forum selection clause. Id. Second, the plaintiff contended 
that the district court had erred by enforcing the forum selection clause despite policy 
interests against its enforcement. Id. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s deci-
sion on both of these issues. Id. at 1330–32. 
18 Id. at 1333; Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290 (“We hold that motions to dismiss upon the ba-
sis of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses are properly brought pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(3) as motions to dismiss for improper venue.”). 
19 Slater, 634 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See 487 U.S. 22, 24, 28 (1988). 
23 See id. at 28. 
24 See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 36–56 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Venue Statutes Deconstructed 
 In Stewart, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is the 
appropriate procedural mechanism to enforce forum selection clauses 
through transfer.26 Section 1404(a) is the domestic transfer of venue 
statute, which allows a district court to transfer a case to any other dis-
trict within the United States where the case could have been brought.27 
Transfers under section 1404(a) are entirely discretionary and require 
the court to determine whether it is convenient for the witnesses and in 
the interest of justice.28 The procedural limitation of section 1404(a), 
however, is that it only applies to cases in which venue is proper.29 
 In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) applies to cases in which venue is 
improper.30 When venue is improper, the district court may either dis-
miss the case outright or transfer the case to any district where the case 
could have originally been brought.31 There are two statutes that de-
termine where venue is procedurally proper—28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 
1441.32 Section 1391 determines where venue is proper when a case is 
originally filed in federal district court.33 Section 1441 applies to cases 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 487 U.S. at 28. 
27 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clari-
fication Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, §§ 202, 204, 125 Stat. 758, 763–64. Specifically, 
section 1404(a) provides that “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest 
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division 
where it might have been brought.” Id. On December 7, 2011, President Obama signed 
into law the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011. Pub. L. No. 
112-63, § 204, 125 Stat. 758, 764 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404). The Act, effective on 
January 6, 2012, amended 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to provide that a court may grant the trans-
fer of a case to any district to which the parties consent. Id. §§ 204–205, 725 Stat. at 764–65 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1390 note). 
28 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
29 Id. But see id. § 1406(a) (2006) (outlining the procedure for curing improper venue). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. §§ 1391, 1441. 
33 Id. § 1391. Section 1391(a) dictates proper venue in diversity cases; section 1391(b) 
applies to cases where jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity. Id. § 1391(a), (b). Under 
section 1391(a), venue is proper: (1) in any district in which any of the defendants reside if 
all defendants reside in the same state, and (2) in any district where a substantial part of 
the events occurred or the property is located. Id. The fallback provision provides that 
venue is proper in any district in which a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at 
the time the action commenced. Id. § 1391(a). Like section 1391(a), venue is proper un-
der section 1391(b) in any district in which any of the defendants reside if all defendants 
reside in the same state and in any district where a substantial part of the events occurred 
or the property is located. Id. § 1391(b). Its fallback provision allows for venue in any dis-
trict where any defendant may be found. Id. 
The amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 under the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011 eliminated the distinction between venue for diversity 
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that have been removed from state court to federal court.34 Further, 
section 1441 only permits one venue: the federal district that encom-
passes the area where the state court proceedings are pending.35 
B. The Various Circuits’ Approaches to Enforcing Forum  
Selection Clauses Through Dismissal 
 After Stewart, the proper procedural mechanism to enforce a forum 
selection clause through dismissal remained unclear.36 As a result, four 
different procedures for enforcing forum selection clauses through 
dismissal emerged among the circuits: (1) motion to transfer venue un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); (3) im-
proper venue under Rule 12(b)(3); and (4) lack of subject matter juris-
diction under Rule 12(b)(1).37 
 Following the first approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit applies 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as the proper mechanism for 
enforcing forum selection clauses.38 That approach was laid out in 2002 
in Kerobo v. Southwestern Clean Fuels, Corp., in which the Sixth Circuit ad-
                                                                                                                      
cases and other cases. Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. at 763. Under the new amend-
ments, venue is proper: (1) in any district in which any of the defendants reside if all de-
fendants reside in the same state; (2) in any district where a substantial part of the events 
or property is located; or (3) if there is no district under either of the first two, any judicial 
district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. 
Additionally, under section 1391(c), venue against a corporation is proper in any dis-
trict where the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Accord-
ingly, in Slater, venue was governed by section 1391(c). 634 F.3d at 1328–29; see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c). Furthermore, the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 
2011 created a distinction in venue for corporations depending on whether the corporate 
entity is a defendant or a plaintiff. Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. at 763. When a cor-
poration is a defendant, it resides in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdic-
tion. Id. In contrast, when a corporation is a plaintiff, it resides in the judicial district 
where it maintains its principal place of business. Id. 
34 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
35 Id. § 1441(a). 
36 E.g., Slater, 634 F.3d at 1332; Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 
1285, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 1998). 
37 E.g., Slater, 634 F.3d at 1332 (recognizing the various approaches taken by the cir-
cuits); Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 534–39 (6th Cir. 2002); AVC Neder-
land B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P’ship, 740 F.2d 148, 152–53 (2d Cir. 1984); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. 
Pac. Sewer Maint. Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1984); see also Sacha Dyson & Kevin D. 
Johnson, My Sandbox or Yours? Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Employment Agreements, 
Fed. Law., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 19, 20 (emphasizing that there is no consistency or agree-
ment among the lower federal courts as to the proper mechanism for enforcing forum 
selection clauses). 
38 Kerobo, 285 F.3d at 534–39. 
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dressed whether a contract for forum could render a statutorily proper 
venue improper.39 The Sixth Circuit concluded that because venue was 
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(3) for improper venue was erroneous.40 Instead, it found that in 
light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart, enforcement of a fo-
rum selection clause should be analyzed under section 1404(a).41 
 In contrast, following the second approach, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit has held that dismissals are proper under 
Rule 12(b)(6).42 The First Circuit established that approach in 1984, in 
LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., when it concluded 
that dismissal based on a forum selection clause was inappropriate un-
der both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(3).43 Specifically, the First Cir-
cuit stated that a forum selection clause does not strip a federal district 
court of jurisdiction.44 Instead, the court held that it is merely a stipula-
tion by the parties asking the court to abstain from exercising its juris-
diction.45 Therefore, using Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction to enforce a forum selection clause through dismissal was 
improper.46 In addition, the court held that dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(3) was improper because venue would be statutorily proper un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1391.47 Accordingly, it held that dismissal for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) is 
the correct procedural mechanism.48 
 Following the third approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits 
have found that Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper mechanism for dismissing 
cases under a forum selection clause.49 These courts have determined 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 Id. at 535. 
40 Id. at 534–36. 
41 Id. at 538–39. In Kerobo, the Sixth Circuit noted that other circuits have subscribed to 
different methods for dismissal—Rule 12(b)(3) and Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 534–35. Al-
though the court stated its disagreement with dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3), it did not 
formally endorse Rule 12(b)(6) as the proper mechanism. Id. at 535. 
42 E.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1112 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit has 
stated, in dicta, that Rule 12(b)(6) would be an appropriate dismissal mechanism. See Sa-
lovaara v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2001). 
43 739 F.2d at 6–7. 
44 Id. at 6. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 7. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 
2006); Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 760–61 (7th Cir. 2006); 
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that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate because the analy-
sis under that mechanism is at odds with the Supreme Court’s standard 
for resolving motions to dismiss based on a forum selection clause.50 
These courts also note that, from a policy perspective, dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) would undesirably enable defendants to wait to bring 
their motions to enforce forum selection clauses until late in the litiga-
tion process.51 
 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has in-
consistently articulated the appropriate mechanism to enforce forum 
selection clauses through dismissal.52 First, in AVC Nederland B.V. v. 
Atrium Investment Partnership, decided in 1984, the Second Circuit found 
that a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
Rule 12(b)(1) was the proper way to resolve forum selection clauses.53 
Yet, in 1997, in New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B & W Diesel AG, the 
court noted that early cases, such as AVC Nederland B.V., mischaracterize 
the vehicle to decline jurisdiction.54 Furthermore, in 1998, in Evolution 
Online Systems, Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., the Second Circuit 
signaled its agreement with the First Circuit, and held that Rule 
12(b)(6) is the proper mechanism.55 Currently, the Second Circuit en-
                                                                                                                      
Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290; Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Commerce Consultants Int’l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.A., 867 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
50 E.g., Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549; Argueta, 87 F.3d at 324. A motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to accept the pleadings as true; in contrast, the Zapata 
standard, articulated in the 1972 Supreme Court decision M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., does not require the court to accept the pleadings as true. Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549 
(citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972)); see also Ryan Holt, A 
Uniform System for the Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 
1913, 1924 n.69 (2009); Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Ex-
amination of the Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal 
for Judicial Reform, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1625, 1645 (2011). 
51 Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549. Rule 12(h)(2) allows any party to bring a motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6) until the end of trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). Therefore, defen-
dants would wait until litigation was not trending in their favor before asserting enforce-
ment of their forum selection clauses. Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549; see also Holt, supra note 50, 
at 1924 & n.70. Because a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) is waived if not raised in 
the first responsive pleading under Rule 12(h)(1), 12(b)(3) motions do not raise the same 
timing concerns. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549; see also Holt, supra note 
50, at 1924 & n.70. 
52 Compare Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koinklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505, 
508 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that dismissal was under Rule 12(b)(6)), with AVC Nederland 
B.V., 740 F.2d at 152–53 (stating that dismissal was under Rule 12(b)(1)). 
53 740 F.2d at 152–53 (determining this in the context of an international agreement). 
54 New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B & W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1997); 
see AVC Nederland B.V., 740 F.2d at 152–53. 
55 145 F.3d at 508 n.6. 
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forces forum selection clauses through Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 
12(b)(6).56 
III. Slater and Stewart Compared 
 Although the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Slater is facially inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart, it nevertheless furthers 
sentiments implicit in Stewart and principles behind forum selection 
clauses generally.57 In Stewart, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
controls transfers pursuant to a forum selection clause, thereby assuming 
that the pre-transfer venue is proper.58 Even though venue is not con-
tractually proper, it is statutorily proper.59 As such, the Supreme Court 
implied that there is a distinction between procedurally proper venue—
that is, venue authorized by statute—and contractually proper venue.60 
                                                                                                                      
 
56 TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 2011). 
57 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 & n.8 (1988) (implying that be-
cause venue was statutorily authorized, it was procedurally proper); Slater v. Energy Servs. 
Grp. Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that § 1404(a) is the 
proper avenue of relief where a party seeks the transfer of a case to enforce a forum-
selection clause, while Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper avenue for a party’s request for dis-
missal based on a forum-selection clause.”); Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 
471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting the disjunction between the presence of a forum 
selection clause and the ability of defendants to raise it during trial); Lipcon v. Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that the Su-
preme Court in Stewart stated that forum selection clauses affect venue). 
58 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. But see David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of 
Two Concepts, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 785, 842–49 (1993) (noting that in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute, the Supreme Court implicitly allowed a defendant to enforce a forum selection 
clause through 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, §§ 202, 204, 125 Stat. 758, 763–64)); 
Wright, supra note 50, at 1639 (stating that the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute arguably overruled Stewart and endorsed 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)). 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clari-
fication Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758, 763; see Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. 
In Stewart, the Supreme Court praised the parties for not contesting the district court’s 
denial of the motion to dismiss for improper venue. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8; see also 
Holt, supra note 50, at 1925 & n.75. Further, the Supreme Court noted that venue was 
proper in that case because 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) authorizes venue in a judicial district in 
which a corporation is doing business. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the parties originally brought the dismissal for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1406(a) rather than Rule 12(b)(3). See id. In Slater, because ESGI does business in Crystal 
River, Florida, venue was statutorily proper in the Middle District of Florida pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c); Slater, 634 F.3d at 1328–29. 
60 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8. In Kerobo v. Southwest Clean Fuels, Corp., the court high-
lighted that: 
the [Stewart] Court footnoted with apparent approval the parties’ agreement 
that the district court had properly denied the motion to dismiss for im-
proper venue because the case had been filed in the venue prescribed by 28 
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Had the Supreme Court found that venue was improper in these cases, it 
would have endorsed the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) rather than section 
1404(a).61 Therefore, because the Supreme Court stated in Stewart that 
whether a venue is statutorily authorized controls for forum selection 
clauses, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Slater—that dismissals should 
be brought under a Rule 12(b)(3) motion for improper venue—is in-
consistent with that holding.62 
 The juxtaposition between Stewart and Slater highlights the incon-
sistency.63 Slater explicitly held that a motion for transfer of venue 
where venue is proper—28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)—applies for transfers un-
der a forum selection clause.64 In contrast, Slater held that enforcement 
of a forum selection clause through dismissal is properly brought as a 
motion to dismiss for improper venue—Rule 12(b)(3).65 Yet, whether a 
forum selection clause is enforced through dismissal or transfer should 
not affect whether a particular venue is proper.66 
 Even though the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Slater is inconsistent 
with the decision in Stewart, it is in line with other aspects of the Su-
preme Court’s decision and furthers specific principles behind forum 
selection clauses.67 First, the Eleventh Circuit rightly recognized the 
Supreme Court’s connection between forum selection clauses and 
venue.68 By holding that a transfer of venue statute applies when par-
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. § 1391, the statute governing venue for cases filed directly in federal 
court. We think this is a clear signal that if venue is proper under the statute, 
a motion to transfer for improper venue will not lie. 
285 F.3d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Stanley E. Cox, Case One: Choice 
of Forum Clauses, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 517, 561 (1995) (“[In Stewart], the forum selection 
clause did not render defective an otherwise appropriate venue. That statement should logi-
cally preclude all motions predicated on the theory that the original court lacks jurisdiction 
or venue by virtue of the forum selection clause.”); Holt, supra note 50, at 1925. 
61 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a). 
62 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. But see Slater, 634 F.3d at 1333 (noting that because Stewart 
dealt procedurally with transfer of venue, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Rule 12(b)(3) 
governs enforcing forum selection clauses through dismissal is not inconsistent with Stewart). 
63 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28; Slater, 634 F.3d at 1333. 
64 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Slater, 634 F.3d at 1333. 
65 Slater, 634 F.3d at 1333. 
66 See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3); supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290. 
68 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. The Eleventh Circuit has noted this very fact in support-
ing its use of Rule 12(b)(3). See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290; see also Holt, supra note 50, at 
1924–25 & n.71; Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Proce-
dure, 25 Cornell Int’l L.J. 51, 51–52 (1992). In Lipcon, the court stated that the Supreme 
Court’s decision that a transfer of venue statute controls for enforcing forum selection 
clauses through transfer provides ample support for their decision that Rule 12(b)(3) is 
the proper 12(b) motion to bring. 148 F.3d at 1290; accord Slater, 634 F.3d at 1332–33. 
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ties seek to enforce forum selection clauses through transfer, the Su-
preme Court implied that forum selection clauses affect venue.69 
                                                                                                                     
 Moreover, 12(b)(3) motions are consistent with the purposes of 
forum selection clauses.70 At the time that parties to an agreement sign 
a contract, they are both put on notice that they have endorsed a par-
ticular forum for suit.71 Therefore, like other motions that fall within 
the purview of Rule 12(h)(1), enforcement of a forum selection clause 
should be raised at the start of litigation or be deemed waived.72 Be-
cause all of the other proposed mechanisms for enforcing forum selec-
tion clauses through dismissal—28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Rule 12(b)(1), 
and Rule 12(b)(6)—fall outside Rule 12(h)(1), they can be raised at 
any point in the litigation.73 This essentially gives parties two bites at the 
apple; parties can begin by pursuing litigation in the non-contracted 
forum and, when it appears that litigation is not going in their favor, 
dismiss the case.74 To endorse such a procedure severely prejudices the 
plaintiff.75 
 
69 See, e.g., Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290. But see Jonathan L. Corsico, Comment, Forum Non 
Conveniens: A Vehicle for Federal Court Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses That Name Non-
Federal Forums as Proper, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1853, 1872 (2003) (emphasizing that there is a 
difference between the concept of inconvenient forum and statutorily improper venue). 
70 See Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Solimine, supra note 68, at 51–52. 
71 See Solimine, supra note 68, at 51–52; see also Wright, supra note 50, at 1645–46. Fo-
rum selection clauses are a way for parties to privatize procedure. See Solimine, supra note 
68, at 51–52. They “permit parties to select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to 
litigate disputes. Such planning permits orderliness and predictability in contractual rela-
tionships, obviating a potentially costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction 
and venue.” Id. Although the parties, in theory, may be on notice that they have agreed to 
a selected forum for litigation, often the parties have unequal bargaining power. Id. at 52. 
72 See Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549. 
73 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)–(5), 12(h)(1); see also Wright, supra note 50, at 1646. Rule 
12(h)(1) states that a party waives its right to raise the defenses under Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) 
by failing to raise any of them in the party’s first motion under Rule 12(b) or by failing to 
raise it in a motion or in a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). The defenses 
subject to Rule 12(h)(1) are: lack of personal jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)); improper 
venue (Rule 12(b)(3)); insufficient process (Rule 12(b)(4)); and insufficient service of 
process (Rule 12(b)(5)). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)–(5), 12(h)(1). 
74 E.g., Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549–50; see also Holt, supra note 50, at 1924 & n.70; Cor-
sico, supra note 69, at 1874–75 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of waiver-
resistant mechanisms, such as Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)); Wright, supra note 50, at 
1646 (discussing that litigants for motions under Rule 12(b)(6) can withhold their objec-
tions until late into litigation, thereby wasting judicial resources). 
75 See Sucampo, 471 F.3d at 549–50. But see Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Ju-
risdiction, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1251 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court favored plain-
tiffs by holding against immediate appeal of a refusal to dismiss based on a contractual 
forum selection clause (citing Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 296 (1989))). 
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Conclusion 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Slater is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart. The Supreme Court, by holding 
that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) controls, has implied that when a case is 
brought in a statutorily authorized venue, venue is procedurally proper. 
Yet, because the Supreme Court stated in Stewart that a forum selection 
clause does not make a procedurally proper venue improper, Slater’s 
holding—that dismissal for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) is the 
proper mechanism to enforce forum selection clauses—is in opposition 
to Stewart. 
 Even though the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Slater is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart, it furthers the policies be-
hind the Supreme Court’s decision and forum selection clauses more 
broadly. By holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) controls when moving to 
transfer under a forum selection clause, the Supreme Court demon-
strated that forum selection clauses directly affect venue. Furthermore, 
because both parties are on notice that a particular forum is designated 
for litigation, the defense of a forum selection clause should be re-
quired to be raised or waived. Rule 12(b)(3) is the only proposed 
mechanism that falls into Rule 12(h)(1)’s purview. 
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